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NOTICE IS NOT ENOUGH: WHY TILA REQUIRES MORE
THAN A LETTER OF INTENT
Levi Smith*
The federal Truth in Lending Act 1 (TILA) provides borrowers
with protections and remedies against certain actions by lenders.
TILA allows, in some circumstances, a borrower to rescind a loan
from a lender within a three-year period from when the loan is
made. However, a circuit split has developed regarding how the
right to rescind must be exercised. Of the circuits that have
considered this question, some require a lawsuit to be filed within
the three-year period to rescind the loan. 2 Other circuits have held
that providing notice of the intent to rescind the loan within the
three-year period is sufficient to rescind the loan, even if a lawsuit
is not filed until beyond the three-year time limit. 3 This Comment
argues that in order to rescind the loan, courts should require that
an actual lawsuit be filed before the three-year period expires.
TILA was enacted to ensure that borrowers could make
informed decisions about consumer loans.4 In fact, TILA is one of
the most powerful tools that borrowers have to protect themselves
from predatory and unscrupulous lenders. 5 To ensure that lenders
comply with TILA’s disclosure requirements, TILA grants
borrowers a limited right to rescind a loan secured by the
borrower’s residence if the lender fails to make the required
disclosures. 6 This incentivizes lenders to follow the requirements
*
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1.
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2006).
2.
See, e.g., McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 2012),
Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2012).
3.
See, e.g., Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2012).
4.
Michael Sabet, Comment, Slamming the Door in the Consumer’s Face: Courts’

Inadequate Enforcement of TILA Disclosure Violations and the False Hope of a
Foreclosure Defense, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 183, 185 (2010).
5.
Kimberley Ayer, Note, Striking a Balance: When to Extend the Right to Rescind
Under TILA, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 261, 262 (2011).
6.
McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1327.
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of the Act. Under TILA, a borrower has a three-day period
following the consummation of the loan to exercise their right to
rescind. 7 However, when a lender fails to provide the required
disclosures to the borrower, TILA provides that the time for
rescission is extended for three years or until the property is sold,
whichever is earlier. 8 This three-year period is a statute of repose
that governs “the life of the underlying right” to rescind. 9 The
right to rescind is completely extinguished at the end of the threeyear period. 10
Although the right to rescind is clearly established by the
statute, a circuit split regarding the proper way and time to
exercise this right has developed in the circuits that have
addressed this issue. In the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, a borrower
must actually file a lawsuit to enforce the borrower’s right to
rescind within the three-year statute of repose. 11 If the lawsuit is
not filed within the three-year period, the right to rescind is lost. 12
But in the Fourth Circuit, the right is preserved beyond the threeyear period if the borrower provides notice to the lender that the
borrower intends to rescind the loan.13 An actual lawsuit does not
need to be filed within the three-year period. 14
Resolution of this divergence depends on either a United
States Supreme Court ruling or congressional action to clarify the
procedural aspects of the rescission provision of TILA. In the
interim, the split has implications for lenders, borrowers, and the
mortgage industry. Lenders are more likely to receive from
borrowers rescission notices that purport to preserve the right to
7.
15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2006).
8.
15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2006).
9.
Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 417 (1998).
10. Id.
11. See McOmie-Grey v. Bank of Am., 667 F.3d 1325, 1327–28 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding
that rescission is not automatic upon borrower’s mere notice of rescission, and the borrower
cannot raise the right to rescind after the three-year period has run); Rosenfield v. HSBC
Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1188 (10th Cir. 2012) (concluding that a borrower’s notice to
bank is insufficient to exercise or preserve a borrower’s right to rescind a loan transaction
under TILA, and TILA established a right of action that must be exercised by invoking the
power of the courts.).
12. Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1188.
13. See Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 278 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding
that borrowers effectively exercised their right to rescind under TILA by sending notices of
rescission to lenders even though the borrowers did not file suit until more than three
years after the consummation of the loan).
14. Id.
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rescind even if a lawsuit is not filed within three years. Given that
asserting an intention to rescind is without cost (unlike a lawsuit),
it’s likely that lenders will receive more of these notices in an
attempt by borrowers to influence restructuring and foreclosure
negotiations by threatening full rescission, even beyond the threeyear period. Consequently, depending on the jurisdiction in which
a suit is ultimately brought, this notice may be effective. In those
cases, lenders cannot be certain that a loan transaction is final
even after the three-year statute of repose has expired. Such
practice will likely add monitoring and response costs to loans,
which may ultimately be passed on to the borrower in the form of
higher fees or interest rates. 15The circuit split also creates
unnecessary uncertainty for borrowers. Borrowers must
investigate the governing law in their jurisdiction and ensure that
the right to rescission is not lost if a suit is not filed within three
years. As borrowers are often less informed and sophisticated than
lenders, such uncertainty may place a burden and inequity upon
these individuals.
The approach taken by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits requiring
a lawsuit to be filed within three years is the best resolution of this
circuit split. Such a rule provides the clearest notice to the lender
that the borrower is seeking to enforce the legal right to rescind.
This rule also encourages a borrower to sue only if the borrower
has a non-frivolous claim for rescission, rather than allowing the
borrower to give mere notice of rescission to influence
negotiations between the two parties. As this “notice” would not be
governed by the same rules that govern legal actions, including
rules that provide sanctions for frivolous lawsuits,16 there is less of
an incentive for borrowers to assess the merits of their claims
before seeking to rescind. Requiring a lawsuit to be filed within
three years also provides more certainty to lenders and borrowers
on the status of the rescission claim, and ultimately reduces the
cost to borrowers of dealing with these claims. These cost savings
may be passed on to consumers, thus improving the lending

15. Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1885 (10th Cir. 2012) (explaining that circumstances could
change in the period between when notice is given of the intent to rescind and the
consummation of the judicial action to rescind which would make the rescission “costly
and difficult.” These additional costs would likely ultimately be borne by borrowers.).
16. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
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climate for those in need of secured capital. 17
Finally, this rule maintains the policy purposes of a statute of
repose. Potential defendants are insured repose after the lapse of
time. 18 A strict limit “encourages prompt assertion of claims to
allow full and fair litigation of the issues” while evidence,
documentation, and witnesses are more recent and available. 19
“Thus, the private interests of potential defendants are served” in
resolving claims filed within the time period, “while public
interests are served as well by keeping stale litigation out of the
courts, barring inefficient use of limited public resources.” 20 The
certainty and efficiency that this outcome promotes is both
embodied by the governing law and is an equitable resolution for
both lenders and borrowers.

17. David Smith & Gregg Stevens, The Impact of TILA on the Debtor-Creditor
Relationship, 61 C ONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 296, 299 (2007) (explaining that “creditors

inevitably seek to cover the costs and legal risks,” which has “contributed to overall higher
costs” to consumers).
18. Daniel Rothstein, Comment, Truth in Lending: The Right to Rescind and the
Statute of Limitations, 14 PACE L. REV. 633, 640 (1994).
19. Id.
20. Id.

